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1. Introduction 
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) has been receiving increasingly significant attention in 
recent years as a promising group of technologies for contributing to mitigating the risk of 
dangerous climate change.  A technical and scientific community developing concepts that 
could be used for widespread commercial-scale use of CCS has existed for some time, e.g. 
(Riemer & Ormerod 1995). Awareness of CCS amongst a broader range of actors is, 
however, a more recent phenomenon. For example, a number of commentators argue that 
2005 was a ‘landmark’ year for recognition of CCS in international communities of actors 
interested in energy and climate change issues.  This was the year that the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change published a special report on CCS (IPCC 2005) 
and also that actions for CCS development were included in the final communiqué of a G8 
summit hosted by the UK in Gleneagles (G8 2005). 
 
CCS was recognised as an option that could be relevant for reducing carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emissions from the UK energy sector by the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution in 
2000 in an influential report (RCEP 2000) that led to a 2003 White Paper commitment by UK 
Government that reducing CO2 emissions should be an integral part of UK energy policy (DTI 
2003). Although CCS was not identified as a high priority, further work was undertaken and 
a 2005 Carbon Abatement Technology Strategy (DTI 2005) suggested a potentially 
substantial role for CCS in the UK if fossil fuels were retained in the energy mix. 
 
Since then there has been continued and steadily increasing interest in CCS within 
Government and from other key stakeholders.  In 2010 an Office of Carbon Capture and 
Storage was established in the Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC 2011a), 
and a summary of the evolution of the recent policy context can be found in (Heptonstall et 
al. 2011). The DECC web pages (http://www.decc.gov.uk/) also provide a useful overview of 
many of the recent and ongoing developments that are likely to have a significant influence 
on whether and when CCS is deployed at commercial or close-to-commercial scale in the UK 
such as: 
 
 UK Government support for CCS demonstration; 
 European schemes that might partially support large-scale CCS projects in the UK; 
 Carbon capture readiness (CCR) requirements for thermal plant with capacities of 
300MWe or higher; and 
 Electricity market reform (often referred to as EMR). 
 
A number of large-scale CCS project concepts have been developed both in the UK and 
internationally (e.g. see (SCCS 2012), but at the time of writing very few projects have been 
able to build successful business cases to allow a positive final investment decision to be 
made.  
 
This working paper is an output from a project funded by UKERC (the UK Energy Research 
Centre) that aims to identify and explore some of the key uncertainties that might have a 
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material impact on if and when large-scale CCS is deployed in the UK. In particular, this 
paper proposes a number of plausible pathways for CCS progress (or lack of progress) until 
2030 and identifies key ‘branching points’ where a particular trajectory for CCS 
development may be determined as different pathways diverge from each other. The 
effectiveness of different criteria to determine which pathway CCS development is following 
can then be assessed (see the Methodology section for a more detailed explanation of the 
approach).  
 
Overall, the project aims to make useful contributions to efforts to determine how both the 
‘viability’ and ‘maturity’ of CCS technology can be assessed more generally. In this context, 
viability refers to several factors that are outlined in more detail in later sections of this 
paper, such as whether independent assessments suggest that CCS technology is 
performing well enough to compete with other options for mitigating the risk of dangerous 
climate change. Although maturity is related to similar concepts it is more concerned with 
how far progressed CCS technology appears to be along a continuum of development, 
rather than the more ‘yes/no’ assessment that might be expected if only viability is 
considered. It is, for instance, possible to envisage that a technology be mature in terms of 
its development but nevertheless not viable unless a set of economic, policy and regulatory 
conditions are met. 
 
The first work package in this project proposed an assessment framework that identified 
seven key uncertainties and a number of related criteria that might be used to judge viability 
and maturity of CCS and potentially also other technologies (Markusson et al. 2012). This 
was complemented by activity in the second work package, which focussed on exploring 
lessons learned from a number of case study examples where technology development 
and/or deployment has faced at least one uncertainty that is in some way analogous to the 
uncertainties identified for CCS2. The third and final work package includes two distinct, but 
linked, activities. A review of the context for CCS development and deployment in the UK 
has been undertaken (Heptonstall et al 2011) and this working paper draws together 
insights from that work with key results from earlier work packages. 
 
As noted above, this working paper uses an analytical method based on describing a 
number of plausible deployment pathways for CCS in the UK and identifying branching 
points that differentiate these pathways to explore how key uncertainties could affect UK 
CCS deployment up to 2030. The analysis is primarily focussed on deployment of CCS in the 
power sector since this is aligned with the initial focus of UK Government funding and also 
much of the CCS literature. It also uses policy ambition as a starting point for defining ‘on-
track’ deployment, rather than the (typically) higher deployment levels suggested by 
industry (see further Box 1 in Section 2). 
 
After describing the key features of the methodology in Section 2, Section 3 outlines the 
pathways and Section 4 presents the branching points analysis. The paper then concludes 
                                               
2 See http://www.ukerc.ac.uk/support/tiki-index.php?page_ref_id=2725 for details of these case 
studies. 
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with a summary of key conclusions (Section 5). As with other analysis of this type, this work 
does not intend to suggest that any particular pathway is more or less probable. Instead, it 
examines a plausible and analytically useful range of potential futures which can then be 
used to help understand how far our uncertainties need to be resolved to achieve 
‘successful’ deployment – and also what circumstances might prevent this. In this way, the 
methodology allows the analysis of the conditions for both ‘successful’ and ‘unsuccessful’ 
CCS deployment by 2030. 
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2. Methodology 
 
One of the goals of this project was to contribute to the analysis of the conditions for both 
‘successful’ and ‘unsuccessful’ CCS deployment by 2030 (which is the agreed endpoint for 
the analysis in this project) and what actions will influence the outcome. To that end, a set 
of pathways (and pathway variants) were developed for CCS from now to 2030, drawing on 
CCS policy documents and research literature, as well as on the case studies from WP2, to 
explore different possible CCS futures. This analysis also serves as a test of the utility of the 
analytical framework from WP1, and to identify modifications needed to the set of 
assessment indicators of CCS uncertainty development proposed there. Finally, the analysis 
allows the identification of key branching points where CCS pathways might diverge (or 
merge), which help illustrate which aspects of CCS futures to monitor, and what actions may 
need to be taken to realise desired pathways. This section sets out the methodological 
approach used in more detail, and justifies the main choices made when designing it. 
 
The choice of pathways should be seen as relevant and plausible (Voß et al. 2004). 
However, this analysis needs to acknowledge the possibility of a wide range of different 
outcomes, to avoid a common pitfall in scenario analysis of focussing only on the futures 
perceived as most desirable or plausible by the analyst (Bryngelsson & Hansson 2009). 
Therefore, a set of three endpoints were selected, which differed widely in the amount of 
CCS deployed. Three endpoints were chosen where we have either (1) reached the more 
ambitious policy targets for CCS deployment, see Box 1, or (2) CCS has failed to ‘deliver’ 
completely, or (3) an ‘in-between’ situation with a moderate level of deployment has 
emerged and the success of the technology ‘hangs in the balance’. The chosen end points 
do not distinguish between different fuel mixes, not because that does not matter, but since 
that was not considered to be the main focus as compared to overall deployment levels in 
this analysis. For a further analysis and justification for this position on fuel mixes, see 
Appendix 1. 
 
To be able to elaborate the possible sequence of events to each of these three endpoints, 
what was essentially a back-casting (Robinson 1982) type approach was adopted, tracing 
possible and coherent pathways from today’s situation - with advanced plans for a first set 
of large-scale, integrated demonstration projects of CCS on power plants - to each of the 
three endpoints. Note that while all the pathways are intended to be plausible, no 
judgement is made as to their likelihood, since we are not in possession of the necessary 
crystal ball. 
 
The elaboration of the pathways also drew on the insights from the case studies (WP2). This 
enabled exploration of how the case study results matter for CCS. It also ensured that the 
pathways descriptions covered the seven uncertainties identified in WP1. The case studies 
are referred to in the pathway descriptions using the notation described in Table 1 below. 
The case studies are available on the project web page of the UKERC website at 
http://www.ukerc.ac.uk/support/tiki-index.php?page_ref_id=2725 . 
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More than one pathway route to a specified end point (level of deployment in 2030) is 
possible, and the analysis includes such pathway variants. A balance had to be struck 
between on one hand including pathway variants to incorporate the rich results from the 
case studies, and on the other hand to limit the number of variants to a manageable 
number. It was judged that pathway 2 offered the most interesting opportunities to develop 
variants. For pathway 3, it is enough that one ‘show-stopper’ development takes place (in 
one area of uncertainty), and a list of such possible developments is enough for the analysis 
of preconditions for successful deployment. In contrast, pathway 1 provides a future where 
‘everything goes right’, and there is a virtuous cycle of improvements across the seven 
uncertainties. Pathway 2 offers in some ways a more interesting ‘grey area’ of simultaneous 
positive and negative developments and tensions between them. Therefore, the analysis 
includes two variants of pathway 2, both of which have the same level of cumulative CCS 
deployment by 2030. 
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Box 1 Choosing the highest CCS deployment level by 2030 
As we noted in the Task 5 working paper, a wide range of CCS deployment 
scenarios have emerged in recent years both from analysis undertaken by or for 
policymakers and from the CCS industry. The most recent of these includes 
analysis by the UK Carbon Capture and Storage Association (CCSA) who suggest 
a ‘planning ambition’ of 20-30GW of CCS in the UK by 2030 in their ‘Strategy 
for CCS in the UK and beyond’ (CCSA 2011). This is described as an ‘ambition’ 
rather than a projection, and coming as it does from the trade body for the 
industry would be expected to present a very positive picture, although it is 
broadly consistent with the aspiration in the 2009 report from DECC’s Advisory 
Committee on Carbon Abatement Technologies (ACCAT) of 5GW of coal-fired 
CCS by 2020 (ACCAT 2009). Even so, these numbers do sit at the very top end 
of the ranges commonly seen in other sources (see below), and possibly 
inconsistent with plausible CO2 pipeline build rates, and the concerns raised by 
some over the time required to accurately characterise potential CO2 storage 
sites (Booer 2011;Cooper 2011).  
Since the ‘On Track’ pathway is based on policy ambitions rather than the 
industry ambitions, it is interesting to consider the DECC and CCC views: 
 The Poyry ( 2009) work which was used to inform the DECC 2050 Pathways 
Analysis (DECC 2010) suggested that 20GW of CCS by 2030 was ‘only just 
plausible’, with a ‘realistic maximum high deployment path’ of 16.5GW 
(corresponding to their ‘Level 3 trajectory’. Even the 10GW corresponding to 
their ‘Level 2 trajectory’ was described as a ‘considerable challenge’ 
(although it should be recognised that achieving the UK’s long-term carbon 
reduction aspirations will be a considerable challenge whatever the mix of 
technologies). 
 The CCC’s 4th Carbon Budget report (CCC 2010b) presented a figure of 15.2 
GW of CCS by 2030 under their 80% CO2 reduction scenario. 
 The ‘central scenario’ in the CCC’s 2011 Renewable Energy Review (CCC 
2011) has a figure of 10.7 GW of CCS plant by 2030. 
 The 2011 Carbon Plan suggests a range between 3GW and 20GW by 2030 
(DECC 2011c). 
 
These different views do not, on the face of it, appear to represent a trend 
towards higher estimates for CCS deployment, and are arguably somewhat at 
odds with the CCSA and (earlier) ACCAT views. If anything, there appears to be 
a reduction in policy aspirations for CCS deployment by 2030. The endpoint for 
the ‘On Track’ pathway therefore assumes a level of CCS deployment of up to 
15GW by 2030. 
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To choose these variants, we drew on the analysis of the case studies from WP2 and the 
analytical framework from WP1. The seven uncertainties are related in multiple ways, and 
the analytical framework set out linkages (Markusson et al 2012). The linkages either 
represent synergies between uncertainties, where improvement in one makes improvement 
in another more likely (or conversely deterioration in one dimension leads to problems 
relating to another uncertainty). As well as these virtuous (and vicious) cycle (Hekkert et al 
2007) type dynamics, there are also instances of tensions between uncertainties, where 
improvement on one creates problems somewhere else. This kind of linkage is especially 
important to analyse, as it indicates situations where trade-offs have to be made between 
different lines of action, and therefore is especially challenging for decision-makers. Three 
trade-offs were identified from the case studies: 
 
1. Early or late selection (lock-in) among technology variants 
2. Choosing the cheapest or the safest storage 
3. Early public engagement or ‘letting sleeping dogs lie’ 
 
Of these, the first one offered the best possibility of integrating results from the case 
studies, and was chosen for the variants for pathway 2. The pathways and variants are 
presented in the next section. 
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Table 1 ‘Uncertainties’ case studies 
Uncertainty Country Notation 
Scaling and speed – CCGT UK Scaling & speed, UK CCGT 
Scaling and speed – FGD USA Scaling & speed, US FGD 
Economics and finance – landfill 
waste 
UK Economics & finance, UK LFW 
Economics and finance – FGD USA Economics & finance, US FGD 
Variety of pathways – nuclear 
power 
France Variety of pathways, FR NP 
Reliable storage – nuclear power UK Reliable storage, UK NP 
System integration – natural gas 
grid 
UK System integration, UK NGG 
Policy, politics and regulation – 
FGD 
UK Policy, politics & regulation, UK FGD 
Public acceptance – natural gas 
grid 
UK Public acceptance, UK NGG 
 
For the characterisation of the different pathways and variants, it was necessary to strike a 
pragmatic balance between including all possibly relevant kinds of events (incl. for example 
cost developments, public acceptance or protest, regulatory developments, etc.) and 
keeping the task manageable. Moreover, the pathways need to characterise not just CCS 
technology in itself, but the context in which it develops, including primarily the 
development of the energy system and of energy and climate policy (Geels 2004;Winskel et 
al. 2008). The pathways were elaborated in terms of the following limited set of key 
characteristics: 
 
- technology choices (capture technologies and share of retrofitting, transport 
technologies and infrastructure designs, storage options used) 
12 
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- technology performance (energy penalty/costs and accumulated experience of reliable 
operation) 
- relation to wider energy system development (mainly the development of other - 
competing and complementary - energy supply technologies, incl. nuclear and wind) 
- energy and climate policy development 
 
Much of the case studies concern events that happened in different governance contexts: 
state-owned regimes, regulated monopolies etc. This analysis includes pathways where the 
state takes on a more interventionist role than is currently the case, extrapolating from 
current Energy Market Reforms, but not futures that include far-reaching nationalisation and 
or very strongly centralised planning of the energy system. 
 
The set of pathways and variants was used to further develop the set of assessment 
indicators presented in WP1. For each uncertainty and assessment indicator of the 
framework, the pathways were compared to see where they differ. Where two pathways 
diverge with respect to any of the indicators, this was identified as part of a branching point 
(Foxon et al. 2012) between the pathways. The branching points can occur at different times 
in the period to 2030, and the project team chose to carry out the comparison at five year 
intervals. This way, a set of four key branching points were identified, with implications for 
choices to be made by policy makers and other decision makers. The branching points 
analysis helped identify a few further assessment indicators that can usefully be added to 
the framework developed in WP1. 
 
This methodology allows the analysis of the conditions for both ‘successful’ and 
‘unsuccessful’ CCS deployment by 2030. The indicative cumulative deployment of CCS in the 
UK for the pathways and variants are shown in Figure 1 below. Note that these deployment 
levels are not an output from a modelling exercise – they result from the construction of 
credible assumptions about deployment within narratives for each pathway and variant, to 
provide a context in which the lessons from the WP2 case studies can be assessed.  
 
The final set of pathways selected for the analysis were as follows: 
 
Pathway 1 – ‘On track’. A broadly successful but not improbably high level of CCS 
deployment, where CCS has, by 2030, an established position as a technically proven and 
financially viable option in the suite of low carbon electricity generation technologies.  
 
Pathway 2, Variant A – ‘Momentum lost’. Commercial scale demonstration of CCS does go 
ahead, and is followed relatively quickly by further deployment up to the mid-2020s. By this 
time, CCS has established itself as technically viable, but from the mid 2020s onwards it is 
not generally a preferred option as part of the low carbon generation mix in the UK. 
Financial viability ends up being marginal. 
 
Pathway 2, Variant B – ‘Slow and sporadic’. Commercial scale demonstration of CCS does go 
ahead, and that this is followed by limited further deployment up to 2030. CCS has 
established itself as technically viable, but it is not generally a preferred option as part of 
13 
UK Energy Research Centre    
the low carbon generation mix in the UK. Financial viability remains marginal with 
deployment in particular niches only.  
 
Pathway 3, ‘Failure’. No CCS deployment beyond a limited demonstration programme.  
 
Figure 1 Indicative cumulative CCS deployment under the four pathways/variants 
 
 
In the next section, the pathways and variants will be presented and described in more 
detail, to be followed by a section on the analysis of branching points and revision of the 
assessment indicators. 
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3. CCS Pathways 
Pathway 1 – ‘On Track’ 
 
‘A high but plausible level of CCS deployment by 2030, based on policy ambitions’ 
Key features 
 
‘On Track’ suggests a broadly successful but not improbably high level of CCS deployment, 
where CCS has, by 2030, an established position as a technically proven and financially 
viable option in the suite of low carbon electricity generation technologies. The indicative 
deployment of, and maximum cumulative electricity generation from, CCS plant is 
summarised in Figure 2 below. The pathway characteristics are described in the sections 
that follow. 
 
Figure 2 ‘On Track’ deployment and annual electricity generation from CCS plant 
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Our definition of ‘technically proven’ is taken to mean that CCS technologies have been 
shown to work reliably at commercial power plant scale, and that Original Equipment 
Manufacturers (OEMs) are willing to provide performance guarantees which are acceptable 
to prospective customers. Implicit in this is that: 
 
 The UK demonstration programme has been successful, and/or that experience in other 
countries has been positive. Part of this is good judgement and part is luck. The choices 
made to focus on a limited range of promising technology varieties turned out to be 
justified and their technical difficulties manageable. Up-scaling is facilitated by modular 
designs (see Scaling & speed, US FGD). 
 Sufficient potential storage sites have been identified and characterised. 
 A storage liability regime has been set up that is both workable for industry (restricted in 
time and amount, no unrealistic criteria) and which inspires confidence in the reliability 
of storage (transparent, economic interests kept in check etc.). 
 CO2 pipeline routes have been successfully built and operated, and any required new 
routes identified. This is facilitated by re-use of natural gas infrastructure (see System 
integration, UK NGG). Early project designs have taken the possibility for regional hubs, 
as well as international inter-connections into account (ibid).  
 The permitting process for CCS projects has proceeded relatively smoothly, and all 
necessary permits have been granted without undue delay. 
 Early engagement with local communities have led to modified projects and allayed fears 
(see Public acceptance, UK NGG) and highlighted local benefits. 
 
It is recognised that these technical issues also bear upon the financial viability issues 
described below, since any technical concerns will have a direct effect on financiers’ and 
project developers’ willingness to invest in CCS projects (Heptonstall et al 2011). In addition, 
‘financially viable’ is taken to mean that CCS projects can be funded through normal project 
finance avenues e.g. they do not require companies to finance such projects wholly ‘on 
balance sheet’. Implicit in this is that: 
 
 The cost of CCS technologies (after taking account of policy support mechanisms) is 
competitive with the alternatives. As we know, competitiveness is not just about having 
comparable costs per unit of output – support mechanisms must also take account of 
differences in the timing and nature of costs between different forms of low carbon 
generation (Gross et al. 2010). This will likely require targeted support until technology 
is more mature – likely at least during the first decade after first large scale operation 
(see Scaling & speed, US FGD). Competition among manufacturers also contributes to 
costs being kept in check (see Scaling & speed, UK CCGT). 
 The policy support may take the form of selective incentives (see Policy, politics & 
regulation, UK FGD) or contracts (see Economics & finance, UK LFW) (Alternatively, the 
power market could be seriously reformed towards a much more dirigiste mode.) 
 Any remaining cost differential can be justified by the additional system-wide benefits 
which CCS may provide over other low-carbon generating options, such as flexibility, 
and the electricity market is structured so that operators of CCS plants can be rewarded 
for these additional benefits. 
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 Generating companies actively choose CCS to complement their other low carbon 
generation assets. 
 Government and regulators build up internal expertise on CCS (see Scaling & speed, US 
FGD; Economics & finance, US FGD; Policy, politics & regulation, UK FGD), and facilitate 
the exchange of information about the technologies (see Scaling & speed, US FGD). 
 
Developments in the electricity market, and the financial and political context 
 
This pathway makes the following assumptions about developments in the UK electricity 
market during the 2010s and 2020s, and the wider financial and political context: 
 
 Following the financial crises of the late 2000s, the UK economy returns to ‘normal’ 
growth levels during the latter half of the 2010s. 
 The UK continues to remain within its carbon budget, with the further implication that 
the international context is broadly supportive of CO2 emissions mitigation action. 
 The policy support mechanisms for renewables and nuclear described in the EMR White 
Paper are translated successfully into legislation during 2014 as planned. 
 The transitional arrangements for renewables do not create a significant hiatus in 
investment for these technologies, and a number of Round 3 offshore wind 
developments are underway by 2020, although the technological challenges of going 
further offshore and into deeper water are substantial and the cost reductions envisaged 
are not delivered as quickly as anticipated. 
 The two new EPR nuclear plants currently under construction (Olkiluoto 3 and 
Flamanville 3) experience continued delays and further cost overruns and do not come 
into operation until the second half of the 2010s. Nevertheless, construction work 
begins on new nuclear projects in the UK around 2015, with the first two plants 
operational by the early 2020s. Whilst these first new nuclear power stations in the UK 
for nearly 30 years represent a significant step, there is no sense of a nuclear ‘gold 
rush’, and investors remain cautious. 
 There is clear and continuous policy support for the ‘2nd tranche’ CCS projects from the 
late 2010s onwards (see Economics & finance, US FGD) as positive experience from the 
demonstration projects increases political confidence that CCS can play a significant 
role, and in spite of utility industry resistance to the costly investments (see Policy, 
politics & regulation, UK FGD). This is coupled with increasing technical concerns over 
managing the GB electricity system with very large fractions of non-dispatchable wind 
power and economically inflexible nuclear power. The supportive political, policy and 
financial environment allows CCS projects to be financed through a combination of debt 
and equity.  
 Deployment could be driven through a mandate or emissions performance standard, but 
would have to be combined with financial incentives (see Policy, politics & regulation, UK 
FGD).  
 By the early 2020s, the continued high costs of offshore wind and nuclear, coupled with 
a successful CCS demonstration programme and cost reductions beginning to emerge 
from ‘2nd tranche’ CCS projects, mean that CCS technologies are considered to be 
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competitive with other low-carbon options – reinforcing the case for policy support for 
‘3rd tranche’ projects, and allowing these projects to be funded through the EMR 
Contract for Difference (CfD) support mechanism, in the same way as nuclear and 
renewables.  
 An increased diversity of UK gas delivery mechanisms, storage options (and possible 
contributions from unconventional gas reserves) reduces concerns over medium to 
long-term gas supplies. 
Timing of CCS deployment up to 2030 
 
The current DECC plan is to review the demonstration programme in 2018, to inform 
decisions on the appropriate support for CCS deployment (DECC 2011b). It is recognised 
that some of the measures in the EMR White Paper may support CCS demonstration projects, 
in addition to the support available through the demonstration programme and the NER 300 
process. However, for this pathway we assume that the value of support under the Feed-in 
Tariff for medium term (and beyond) commercial deployment of CCS may not be finalised 
until the operational experience from the demonstration projects is available. This would 
suggest that it is very unlikely that any ‘2nd tranche’ CCS plants will be under construction or 
operational before 2018, on the premise that the final investment decision for the these 
plants will not be possible until the support available is fully understood. We would however 
expect developers to have a number of projects in earlier stages of development during the 
mid to late 2010s (‘development’ in this context means the process of putting together the 
technical and financial plans for a project). This suggests that the earliest any ‘2nd tranche’ 
plants might be operational is by the early-to-mid 2020s, with ‘3rd tranche’ plants following 
in the period up to 2030, as described in the table below:  
 
 
Table 2 ‘On Track’ timeline 
Year(s) Progress Cumulative 
deployment 
Mid-to-
late 2010s 
1GW of demonstration plants operational. 1GW 
Late 
2010s 
‘2nd tranche’ projects in early stage of planning, but 
no final investment decision. 
1GW 
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Year(s) Progress Cumulative 
deployment 
Early-to-
mid 2020s 
3GW of ‘2nd tranche’ plants operational.  
‘3rd tranche’ plants in development. 
4GW 
Mid 2020s 
- 2030 
1 or 2 ‘3rd tranche’ plants with combined capacity of  
around 1.5GW comes into operation each year over a 
period of 6 or 7 years. 
Up to 15GW 
2030 Plans for further CCS plants are actively under 
consideration by generating companies. 
Up to 15GW 
 
The ‘On Track’ pathway therefore represents a CCS deployment level of up to around 15GW 
by 2030, with gas-fired plant dominating (see Appendix 1 for the rationale for this 
dominance). This also seems consistent with an assumption that strong progress is made in 
deploying renewables and nuclear which limits the use of fossil fuels in power generation – 
which seems a reasonable view given that many commentators suggest that  the EMR 
appears to be focussed on these technologies (Heptonstall et al 2011). Of course, it is 
possible that if renewables and/or nuclear deployment does not proceed in line with 
aspirations then there may be very strong incentives to increase CCS deployment above the 
level suggested here (for example by fitting CCS to capture-ready CCGT plants) in order to 
meet the 2030 carbon reduction aspirations, assuming of course that political commitment 
to these targets does not weaken. 
 
Nevertheless, even achieving up to around 15 GW by 2030 will require very strong policy 
support, and it is not clear at this stage if the EMR will deliver this for CCS. It is certainly the 
case that the CCSA don’t appear to think that it sends a strong enough message (CCSA 
2011), although there are still some important details of the support mechanism that have 
yet to be decided upon which could have a significant impact, either positive or negative 
(Heptonstall et al 2011). Another important point to note is that if CCS is deployed 
successfully at this level (particularly at the upper end of the range), it may increase the 
likelihood that some of the CCS plants will run at mid-merit (which we have not attempted 
to reflect in the ‘maximum generation’ line on Figure 3). This would in turn increase cost per 
unit of output and also perhaps drive technology choice since some technologies may be 
better suited (either technically or economically) to part-load running. Policy must therefore 
explicitly consider where CCS plants will sit in the merit order because that will drive the 
support and market structure required. 
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Pathway 2, Variant A – ‘Momentum lost’ 
 
‘Timely CCS demonstration and follow-on deployment, then peters out’ 
Key features 
 
‘Momentum lost’ suggest that commercial scale demonstration of CCS does go ahead, and 
is followed relatively quickly by further deployment up to the mid-2020s. Early focus on one 
or a few technology variants turns out to be fortunate (see Economics & finance, FGD US; 
Variety of pathways, FR NP; Scaling & speed, UK CCGT). CCS has established itself as 
technically viable, but from the mid 2020s onwards it is not generally a preferred option as 
part of the low carbon generation mix in the UK. Financial viability remains marginal. 
 
Whilst the UK Government remains supportive of CCS, technical challenges encountered 
during the scaling up for ‘2nd tranche’ projects raise fresh concerns, and opposition to the 
resultant increased cost. Concerns over public acceptance of further pipeline routes (after 
very limited consultation  on early ones, see Public acceptance, UK NGG) and storage sites 
(after an event with limited leakage), make political support for CCS less emphatic – which in 
turn increases investor concerns over policy risk (see below). The indicative deployment of, 
and maximum cumulative electricity generation from, CCS plant is summarised in Figure 3. 
The pathway characteristics are described in the sections that follow. 
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Figure 3 ‘Momentum lost’ deployment and annual electricity generation from CCS plant 
 
 
One outcome to note is that whilst both Pathway 2 variants arrive at the same 2030 
endpoint in terms of GW deployed, and ‘Momentum lost’ suggests that CCS is moribund by 
that date, this pathway does actually deliver more cumulative CCS-derived TWh by 2030 
than ‘Slow and sporadic’ (560 TWh vs. 307 TWh), because of the initial earlier deployment. 
 
Our definition of ‘technically viable’ for this pathway variant is taken to mean that CCS 
technologies have been shown to work at power plant scale, although OEMs are cautious 
about providing normal performance guarantees. Implicit in this is that: 
 
 The UK demonstration programme has been generally successful, and experience from 
demonstration plants in other countries has also been positive. 
 However, scale-up of the components in the full generation and CCS chain encounters 
more technical challenges than anticipated. The overall impact is that ‘2nd tranche’ CCS 
projects incur higher costs and lower availability than originally envisaged, increasing 
investor concerns (see below). Note that this is reflected in Figure 3 by reducing average 
plant load factors to 60% up to 2020, although this makes very little difference to the 
cumulative CCS generation by 2030. 
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 A range of potential storage sites, sufficient to support several GW of CCS generation 
have been identified and characterised. However, identification and characterisation of 
further sites is very limited. 
 Some CO2 pipeline routes have been successfully built and operated, albeit in UK regions 
which may take a relatively ‘more accepting’ view than the norm. As the number of CCS 
projects increases, pipelines are required in ‘less accepting’ regions, leading to 
increased public opposition. 
 
‘Marginal financial viability’ is taken to mean that prospective CCS projects do not generally 
offer a compelling investment opportunity (particularly when compared to other power 
generation options). Implicit in this is that: 
 
 The experience of ‘2nd tranche’ project costs increases and reduced plant availability 
means that the cost of CCS technologies (after taking account of any technology-neutral 
low carbon support mechanisms) is not generally competitive with the alternatives. 
 Any additional system-wide benefits which CCS may provide over other low-carbon 
generating options, such as flexibility, are not yet required as existing unabated plant 
continues to fulfil this role, so the market is not structured to allow operators of CCS 
plants to be rewarded for these benefits. The limited level of CCS deployment in this 
pathway (see below) does at least mean that all CCS plants are typically running at or 
near baseload (where technical availability allows) so there is no specific concern over 
how CCS plants could be rewarded sufficiently when running mid-merit. 
 Deriving business models which provide appropriate incentives to all the actors in the 
CCS chain, and contractual arrangements which ensure the necessary cooperation and 
risk-sharing between actors, is more challenging than anticipated. 
 Whilst generating companies continue to assess potential CCS projects as part of their 
medium and long term strategy, any such projects considered from the early 2020s 
onwards fail at a relatively early stage in a company’s internal project review process as 
costs and risks (both technical and policy) outweigh prospective returns. 
 
Developments in the electricity market, and the financial and political context 
 
This pathway makes the following assumptions about developments in the UK electricity 
market during the 2010s and 2020s, and the wider financial and political context: 
 Following the financial crises of the late 2000s, the UK economy returns to growth 
(albeit subdued) during the latter half of the 2010s. 
 The UK continues to remain within its carbon budget, with the further implication that 
the international context is broadly supportive of CO2 emissions mitigation action. 
 The policy support mechanisms for all low carbon generation (including CCS) described 
in the EMR White Paper are translated successfully into legislation during 2014 as 
planned. 
 The transitional arrangements for renewables create something of a hiatus in investment 
for these technologies, and the two new EPR nuclear plants currently under construction 
(Olkiluoto 3 and Flamaniville 3) are not operational until the late-2010s. The combined 
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effect is to prompt policy makers and investors to consider CCS more quickly and more 
aggressively than would otherwise be the case. 
 Relatively bullish early policy, planning and project management sidelines any public 
protests, but the protests snowball and eventually reach parliament undermining policy 
support (see Public acceptance, UK NGG). 
 Too strong push also leads to premature choice of technology, leading to poor 
performance and high costs (see below) (see Variety of pathways, FR NP; Scaling & 
speed, UK CCGT; Scaling & speed, US FGD; Economic and finance, US FGD). Also site 
selection turned out to have been hasty, with instances of CO2 leaking, further eroding 
public support (see Reliable storage, UK NP). 
 The relatively aggressive roll-out and scale-up of ‘2nd tranche’ projects encounters 
technical problems which result in cost increases and reduced reliability (availability) of 
these plants in their early years of operation. This has the effect of reducing policy 
makers and investor confidence, and the general view from 2025 onwards is of the need 
to ‘take stock’ of CCS deployment to date and allow the ‘2nd tranche’ plants to ‘prove 
themselves’ before further policy support for any ‘3rd tranche’ plants. 
 The increased diversity of UK gas supplies, delivery mechanisms and storage options 
that are in place by the early 2020s reduces exposure to gas price volatility, so reducing 
the perceived value of coal-fired CCS as a hedge against gas price volatility. Generators 
remain largely able to pass the marginal cost of electricity generation at NGCC plants 
through to consumers.  Hence, gas price increases are passed through to consumers, as 
are any significant increases in costs for emitting CO2, so unabated gas remains 
competitive in the market and continues to provide a balancing role. 
 
Timing of CCS deployment up to 2030 
 
This pathway assumes that two or three demonstration plants secure funding from DECC 
(and possibly NER300 funding), agree contractual terms and proceed, and come into 
operation by 2017. Clear support for ‘2nd tranche’ plants through the EMR policies 
encourages progress with further, larger projects, and a further 5-6GW is deployed by the 
mid 2020s. The rapid scale up required for these ‘2nd tranche’ plants creates a range of 
technical issues which whilst not insurmountable, do increase costs and affect the 
availability of these plants in their early years of operation. This leads to a reduction in 
enthusiasm for further CCS plants, and no more plants are in development during the 
second half of the 2020s. The result is that total CCS deployment by 2030 is around 6-7GW. 
 
As far as the fuel and technology mix is concerned, this pathway is based on the same 
observations and logic as for the ‘On Track’ pathway (see Appendix 1). At the time of 
writing, current UK Government policy for commercial-scale demonstration at power plants 
is that a range of CCS (and especially CO2 capture) technologies will be included in the early 
stages of this programme, potentially including both coal and gas-fired power plants. As in 
the ‘On Track’ pathway, it does not seem sensible to make specific assumptions about the 
technology mix e.g. whether pre- or post-combustion capture dominates, particularly given 
the relatively limited deployment of post-demonstration plants envisaged in this pathway. 
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Table 3 ‘Momentum lost’ timeline 
Year(s) Progress Cumulative 
deployment 
Mid-to-
late 2010s 
Up to 1GW of demonstration plants operational.  Up to 1GW 
Early-to-
mid 2020s 
Up to 5-6GW of ‘extended 2nd tranche’ plants 
operational. 
Up to 6-7GW 
Late 
2020s 
No further plants in development Up to 6-7GW 
2030 No ‘3rd tranche’ plants in development Up to 6-7GW 
 
Whilst this pathway variant ‘peters out’, it is not impossible that it is followed (after 2030) 
by a renewed policy push, based on a switch to other technology, and probably with a 
bigger emphasis of import of technology developed elsewhere, is successful and leads to 
further deployment (see Variety of pathways, FR NP). Implicit in this is that effective 
international knowledge sharing and well-functioning international supply chains mean that 
the UK is well prepared to benefit from the technology variants that turned out to work well 
(see Policy, politics & regulation, UK FGD; Variety of pathways, FR NP). It is debatable how 
useful it is to start investing seriously in CCS as late as in the 2030, if it is intended to be a 
stop-gap solution to buy time to develop other low carbon technologies. If, however, CCS is 
seen as a longer-term solution, for fossil based production, biomass CCS, air capture, then 
it makes sense. 
 
Pathway 2, Variant B – ‘Slow and sporadic’ 
 
‘CCS demonstration delayed and deployed relatively slowly thereafter’ 
Key features 
 
‘Slow and sporadic’ suggest that commercial scale demonstration of CCS does go ahead, 
and there is limited further deployment up to 2030 following the initial demonstration 
programme. CCS has established itself as technically viable, but it is not generally a 
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preferred option as part of the low carbon generation mix in the UK. Financial viability 
remains marginal. 
 
Whilst the UK Government remains supportive of CCS, opposition to the cost (of CCS and 
other low carbon options), and issues of public acceptance over pipeline routes and storage 
sites, makes political support for CCS less emphatic – which in turn increases investor 
concerns over policy risk (see below). The indicative deployment of, and maximum 
cumulative electricity generation from, CCS plant is summarised in Figure 4 below. The 
pathway characteristics are described in the sections that follow. 
 
Figure 4 ‘Slow and sporadic’ deployment and annual electricity generation from CCS plant 
 
 
Our definition of ‘technically viable’ is taken to mean that CCS technologies have been 
shown to work reliably at power plant scale, although OEMs are cautious about providing 
normal performance guarantees. Implicit in this is that: 
 
 The UK demonstration programme has been generally successful, albeit progress has 
been slower than hoped for. Experience in other countries has also been positive, but as 
in the UK, slower than hoped. 
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 Integration, scale-up and optimisation of the components in the full generation and CCS 
chain encounters more technical challenges than anticipated. The overall impact is that 
early CCS projects incur higher costs than originally envisaged, increasing investor 
concerns (see below). 
 A contributing factor is also the difficulty in coordinating and organising the different 
kinds of expertise needed for making a CCS system work, slowing down system 
integration (see System integration, UK NGG). 
 A range of potential storage sites have been identified although the fraction that is 
sufficiently well-characterised is limited. 
 Some CO2 pipeline routes have been successfully built and operated, but progress is 
slower than expected possibly due to delays with permitting, in some areas 
characterised by poorly executed public engagement (see Public acceptance, UK NGG) 
and resourceful communities, rather than technical problems. Delays may have also 
resulted from insufficient policy support to facilitate collective planning and sizing for 
pipeline networks. 
 
‘Marginal financial viability’ is taken to mean that prospective CCS projects do not generally 
offer a compelling investment opportunity (particularly when compared to other power 
generation options). Implicit in this is that: 
 
 Current estimates about costs turn out to have been too optimistic. Cost escalation is 
driven by unforeseen technical problems relating to scaling (see Scaling & speed, US 
FGD; Economics & finance, US FGD) and system integration, as well as by continued 
controversy about risk sharing and funding. The cost of CCS technologies (after taking 
account of any technology-neutral low carbon support mechanisms) is only competitive 
with the alternatives in certain (relatively rare) niches or project-specific circumstances 
e.g. a particularly fortuitous combination of site availability, connection to a revenue-
generating enhanced oil recovery project, suitability for retrofit, availability of regional 
policy support. Depleted hydrocarbon fields might also be more attractive than saline 
formations, because CO2 storage could delay any regulated liabilities from earlier 
hydrocarbon exploration, and so offset moderate storage related liabilities (see 
Economics and finance, UK LFW). It may also be that CCS is used mainly where there are 
fewer options, like on industrial processes. 
 Niche deployment may have an impact on the technical variety of CCS solutions as some 
variants may fit better to the prevailing project-specific circumstances. This may mean 
that the CCS technology adopted by such projects may not be the same as those 
adopted in other countries with different national policies or circumstances, which in 
turn may have important implications for learning, standardisation and cost reduction. 
 Whilst this project focuses on CCS on fossil fuelled power, it is worth noting that a niche 
dominated deployment could perhaps be dominated by niches outside power 
production. CCS may face less competition as a mitigation option in some industrial 
processes, or needed in CO2 negative systems together with biomass based production. 
 Any additional system-wide benefits which CCS may provide over other low-carbon 
generating options, such as flexibility are not yet required as existing unabated plant 
continues to fulfil this role, so the market is not structured to allow operators of CCS 
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plants to be rewarded for these benefits. The limited level of CCS deployment in this 
pathway (see below) does at least mean that all CCS plants are typically running at or 
near baseload so there is no specific concern over how CCS plants could be rewarded 
sufficiently when running mid-merit. 
 Deriving business models which provide appropriate incentives to all the actors in the 
CCS chain, and contractual arrangements which ensure the necessary cooperation and 
risk-sharing between actors, is more challenging than anticipated. (Cf. liability risks 
above, potentially making saline formations especially financially unattractive, (see 
Economics and finance, UK LFW). 
 Whilst generating companies continue to assess potential CCS projects as part of their 
medium and long term strategy, such projects often fail at a relatively early stage in a 
company’s internal project review process as costs and risks (both technical and policy) 
are expected to outweigh prospective returns. 
 
Developments in the electricity market, and the financial and political context 
 
This pathway makes the following assumptions about developments in the UK electricity 
market during the 2010s and 2020s, and the wider financial and political context: 
 Following the financial crises of the late 2000s, the UK economy returns to growth 
(albeit subdued) during the latter half of the 2010s. 
 The UK continues to aspire to remain within its carbon budget, with the further 
implication that the international context is broadly supportive of CO2 emissions 
mitigation action. 
 The policy support mechanisms for renewables and nuclear described in the EMR White 
Paper are translated successfully into legislation during 2014 as planned. 
 The transitional arrangements for renewables do not create a significant hiatus in 
investment for these technologies, and a number of Round 3 offshore wind 
developments are well underway by 2020, with the offshore wind supply chain reaching 
a sustainable critical mass, with clear evidence of cost reductions emerging. 
 The two new EPR nuclear plants currently under construction (Olkiluoto 3 and 
Flamanville 3) are completed and operational by the mid-2010s, reducing investor 
uncertainty, and giving fresh impetus to the new nuclear programme in the UK. 
 During the 2010s, subdued UK economic growth focuses attention on the costs to 
consumers and the impact on industrial competitiveness of relatively high cost and 
unproven CCS (by the mid-2010s only one or two CCS demonstration plants are 
operational and further demonstration plants are under construction so it is too early for 
cost reductions to emerge). The result is that the policy support required for ‘2nd 
tranche’ CCS projects becomes politically challenging during the latter half of the 2010s. 
Whilst support is forthcoming, it is only sufficient for a limited number of ‘2nd tranche’ 
projects (i.e. those that benefit from the fortuitous combination of project-specific 
characteristics described above). Continued uncertainty about the market – in the UK 
and beyond – limits the ability of domestic industry to build and maintain capabilities 
(see Scaling & speed, US FGD). Faltering political will leads to policy capture and delay 
(see Policy, politics & regulation, UK FGD). 
27 
UK Energy Research Centre    
 In the absence of a policy context to the contrary, most of the ‘big six’ UK electricity 
generators continue to be preoccupied with new build of nuclear, renewables and 
(unabated but relatively low carbon) CCGT, and do not prioritise investment in CCS. 
 An increased diversity of UK gas delivery mechanisms and storage options reduces 
exposure to gas price volatility, so reducing the perceived value of coal-fired CCS as a 
hedge against gas price volatility. Generators remain largely able to pass the marginal 
cost of electricity generation at NGCC plants through to consumers.  Hence, gas price 
increases are passed through to consumers, as are any significant increases in costs for 
emitting CO2, so unabated gas remains competitive in the market and continues to 
provide a balancing role. 
 
Timing of CCS deployment up to 2030 
 
This pathway assumes that one or two demonstration plants secure funding from DECC, 
agree contractual terms and proceed, albeit delays mean that they are not operational until 
2015-2016 (two years later than planned when the demonstration programme was 
announced). Progress is hampered by difficulties in coordinating the demonstration 
programme and NER300 funding with as yet unclear UK policy support. Later demonstration 
projects are also brought to financial close but construction work does not begin until 2014 
(again, two years later than planned). These plants are not operational until 2018 or later so 
there is little accumulated operating experience on which to base plans for the ‘2nd tranche’ 
of CCS until the early 2020s (although if other countries are able to move more quickly their 
experience may be useful). Construction work on the first of the ‘2nd tranche’ plants does 
not begin until the early-to-mid-2020s. The ‘2nd tranche’ phase is extended throughout the 
late 2020s (in comparison to the ‘On Track’ pathway) since there is insufficient intensity of 
activity to move the industry to the ‘3rd tranche’ stage until the very end of the 2020s or the 
early 2030s. The result is that CCS plants are being built throughout most of the 2020s but 
the project pipeline is sporadic, meaning that total deployment by 2030 is around 6-7GW. 
 
Whilst no further CCS projects having reached financial close at that time, we would however 
expect developers to have a number of projects in earlier stages of development during the 
late 2020s, so that projects are in position for final investment decisions during the 2030s 
(as before, ‘development’ in this context means the process of putting together the 
technical and financial plans for a project). Of course, if CCS costs were to fall by the early 
2030s then such projects may go on to be approved and built during the 2030s.  
 
As far as the fuel and technology mix is concerned, this pathway is based on the same 
observations and logic as for the ‘On Track’ pathway (see Appendix 1). At the time of 
writing, current UK Government policy for commercial-scale demonstration at power plants 
is that a range of CCS (and especially CO2 capture) technologies will be included in the early 
stages of this programme, potentially including both coal and gas-fired power plants. As in 
the ‘On Track’ pathway, it does not seem sensible to make specific assumptions about the 
technology mix e.g. whether pre- or post-combustion capture dominates, particularly given 
the relatively limited deployment of post-demonstration plants envisaged in this pathway. 
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Table 4 ‘Slow and sporadic’ timeline 
Year(s) Progress Cumulative 
deployment 
Late 
2010s 
Up to 1GW of demonstration plants operational.  Up to 1GW 
Mid-to 
late 2020s 
Up to 5-6GW of ‘extended 2nd tranche’ plants 
operational.  
Up to 6-7GW 
2030 Some ‘3rd tranche’ plants in the early stages of project 
development, prior to final investment decision. 
Up to 6-7GW 
 
Pathway 3 – ‘Failure’ 
 
‘Zero CCS deployment (excluding demonstration plants)’ 
Key features 
 
Since this pathway has no CCS deployment beyond a limited demonstration programme, the 
key features are focussed on the possible reasons for failure, and these can be broadly 
categorised as being either specific to CCS or related to wider developments in the 
electricity market, and the financial and political context. The CCS-specific reasons are dealt 
with in this section and the wider context issues are dealt with in a following section. This 
‘Failure’ pathway may result from either one of the following issues becoming a ‘show 
stopper’ or, perhaps more likely, a combination of acute problems in a number of areas 
having the same cumulative effect: 
 
 The first project(s) from the UK demonstration programme are delivered significantly 
later than planned. These delays mirror experience from CCS projects in other countries. 
 Integration, scale up and optimisation of the components in the full generation and CCS 
chain encounters substantially more technical challenges than anticipated. The overall 
impact is that the first demonstration projects incur significantly higher costs than 
originally envisaged. This experience is replayed in subsequent demonstration project(s) 
since a different suite of technologies are employed so there is limited scope for 
learning from the first project (see Variety of pathways, FR NP – the early years of focus 
on gas cooled, graphite reactors). 
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 It proves very difficult to devise a business model which can provide appropriate 
incentives and contractual safeguards whilst ensuring the necessary cooperation and 
risk-sharing between all the actors in the CCS chain (which is also a contributing factor 
in the demonstration project delays). 
 Although some potential storage sites have been identified, very few have been 
sufficiently well characterised (or have been characterised and found to be unsuitable) to 
give confidence to project developers and investors. 
 Those CO2 pipeline routes that are built encounter significant public opposition. People 
react against the uncertainties of the novel CO2 transporting phenomenon, as well as 
against clumsy attempts at consultation without any real engagement with or influence 
offered to local communities (see Public acceptance, UK NGG). 
 The anticipated cost of future CCS projects (relative to alternative low-carbon generation 
options, and after taking account of support mechanisms) is not competitive. 
 Potential investors view the technical, financial and policy risks (see below) around CCS 
as being too high to make further projects attractive.  
 
It is interesting to note that few of the lessons from the uncertainties case studies appear to 
connect directly to this ‘Failure’ pathway. This may be because, with the arguable exception 
of (Reliable storage, UK NP), the analogues selected for study in Work Package 2 did not 
generally have a final outcome of failure. Indeed, whilst several of the analogues 
encountered significant difficulties and challenges, most eventually resulted in a more or 
less successful outcome. This is perhaps an important lesson in itself, in that it 
demonstrates that significant technical, financial and public policy issues can be managed 
provided there is sufficient collective will, over a sufficiently long period of time (although it 
may also reflect a bias in the selection of case studies). 
 
Developments in the electricity market, and the financial and political context 
 
This pathway makes the following assumptions about developments in the UK electricity 
market during the 2010s and 2020s, and the wider financial and political context: 
 The UK continues to aspire to remain within its carbon budget and the international 
context remains broadly supportive of CO2 emissions mitigation action. However, 
climate targets are not universally seen as being fully binding and it is not clear whether 
failure of CCS simply means meeting our emissions targets through other means, or it 
(partly) reflects a relaxation of these targets.  
 The policy support mechanisms for renewables and nuclear described in the EMR White 
Paper are translated successfully into legislation during 2014 as planned. 
 The transitional arrangements for renewables do not create a significant hiatus in 
investment for these technologies, and a number of Round 3 offshore wind 
developments are well underway by 2020, with the offshore wind supply chain reaching 
a sustainable critical mass, with clear evidence of cost reductions emerging. 
 The two new EPR nuclear plants currently under construction (Olkiluoto 3 and 
Flamanville 3) are completed and operational by the mid-2010s, reducing investor 
uncertainty, and giving fresh impetus to the new nuclear programme in the UK. 
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 During the 2010s, continued slow or non-existent UK economic growth focuses 
attention on the costs to consumers and the impact on industrial competitiveness of 
relatively high cost and unproven CCS, meaning that improved policy support for CCS 
becomes politically challenging. Crucially, by this time the UK government is committed 
to support for renewables and nuclear because that was legislated during 2014, but 
details of support for CCS were not made clear at this time so CCS support is a ‘new ask’ 
of politicians and the electorate, and CCS appears to offer no clear and compelling 
advantages over the incumbent generating technologies. 
 The delays and the revealed poor performance of the CCS technologies erode support 
for this mitigation option, so that it is dropped from the climate policy agenda. 
 The ‘big six’ UK electricity generators are preoccupied with new build of nuclear, 
renewables and (unabated but relatively low carbon) CCGT, and in the absence of a full 
CCS demonstration programme and with continued strong policy support for proven 
alternatives, they do not prioritise investment in CCS. There is also a continuing strain 
on companies finances which means that ‘on balance sheet’ financing of large-scale CCS 
projects is not possible, compounded by the anticipated low returns (which rules out 
equity finance) and riskiness (which rules out debt finance). 
 Decreased use of fossil fuels contributes to declining enthusiasm for CCS demonstration 
deployment (even though a significant proportion of the electricity delivered in the UK is 
still from unabated fossil-fired plants, with the accompanying emissions which that 
implies). 
 An increased diversity of UK gas delivery mechanisms and storage options reduces 
exposure to gas price volatility, so reducing the perceived value of coal-fired CCS as a 
hedge against gas price volatility. Generators remain largely able to pass gas price 
increases through to consumers, so unabated gas remains competitive in the market and 
continues to provide a balancing role, even if relatively low gas prices do not sustain. 
 
Timing of CCS deployment to 2030 
 
This pathway assumes that a first commercial-scale demonstration plant does get funding 
approval from DECC and goes ahead, albeit continuing delays mean that it is not operational 
until between 2016 and 2018, several years later than planned. Progress on further 
demonstration plants is hampered by increasing concerns over delays to the first project. 
The result, summarised in the table below, is that only one more demonstration plant is 
built, giving an installed CCS capacity of less than 1GW by the early 2020s, with no appetite 
amongst generating companies for any more CCS plants. 
 
In terms of fuel and technology mix, this pathway is based on similar assumptions to the 
other two pathways (insofar as they apply) i.e. current UK policy for commercial-scale 
demonstration at power plants is that a range of CCS (and especially CO2 capture) 
technologies will be included in the early stages of this programme, potentially including 
both coal and gas-fired power plants. It does not seem sensible to make specific 
assumptions about the technology mix e.g. whether pre- or post-combustion capture 
dominates, particularly given the very small number of plants envisaged in this pathway. 
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Table 5 ‘Failure’ timeline 
Year(s) Progress Cumulative 
deployment 
Mid-to-
late 2010s 
One  <500MW demonstration plant operational  <500MW 
Early 
2020s 
2nd demonstration plant (<500MW) operational 
 
<1GW 
Mid-to-
late 2020s 
No further plants in development <1GW 
2030 No further plants in development. <1GW 
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4. Branching points 
Identifying branching points 
We have here analysed the pathway and variants in section 3, with respect to key 
developments relating to each of the seven uncertainties, over the period studied. See tables 
6-11 below. Note that the tables do not explicitly refer to all the indicators from WP1 
analytical framework. Items marked in red and underlined indicate where branching points 
between pathways occur. Typically only one of the pathways is marked red for a given 
branching point between them. 
 
 
Table 6 Uncertainty 1: Variety of pathways 
  2015 2020 2025 2030 
On track  
(PW1) 
early choices are 
made  
 early choices 
pay off   
Momentum lost 
(PW2A) 
early choices are 
made   
early choices 
were dear   
Slow and sporadic  
(PW2B)    
some variety, in 
niches   
Failure  
(PW3)       
high variety 
remains 
 
The variety of pathways uncertainty is a key differentiator between the pathways and 
variants. Firstly, in PW1 and PW2A early choices are made to focus on specific technology 
variants, but not in PW2B and PW3. Secondly, the early choices in pay off in PW1 in terms of 
good technology performance in the 2025 period, but not in PW2A. In PW2B, the variety is 
somewhat limited in the 2025 period by the viability of CCS being limited to specific market 
niches, corresponding to particular technologies. 
 
 
Table 7 Uncertainty 2: Safe storage 
  2015 2020 2025 2030 
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On track  
(PW1) 
full speed ahead 
with 
characterisa-tion       
Momentum lost 
(PW2A)   limited char.  
Slow and sporadic  
(PW2B)   
some char., 
variety of options 
focus on oil/gas 
(?)   
Failure  
(PW3)   very limited char.     
 
The safe storage uncertainty also has an early branching point, where PW1 makes the most 
early progress with site characterisation. PW2A also makes early progress, but this peters 
out after the technology runs into problems (relating to costs, leakage etc.) in the 2025 
period. In PW2B the progress is slower but does not stop, but may be limited to some 
storage options. 
 
 
Table 8 Uncertainty 3: Speed of scaling and deployment 
  2015 2020 2025 2030 
On track  
(PW1) 0.3 2, modular 7 15 
Momentum lost 
(PW2A) 0.3 3.5 7, cost hikes 7 
Slow and sporadic  
(PW2B) 0.3 
1, moderate cost 
hikes 3.3 7 
Failure  
(PW3) 0.3 <1 <1 <1 
 
This uncertainty is closely linked to uncertainty 1 ‘Variety of pathways’. In PW1 rapid 
upscaling and deployment works out, facilitated by, among other things, a modular 
approach to upscaling. In PW2A, early technology choices turn out to be unfortunate and 
cause sharp cost rises in the 2020s, leading to a loss of momentum. In PW2B there are more 
moderate problems with costs. 
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Table 9 Uncertainty 4: System integration 
  2015 2020 2025 2030 
On track  
(PW1) 
designs modified 
from start       
Momentum lost 
(PW2A)    
collaboration 
difficulties    
Slow and sporadic  
(PW2B)   
some 
collaboration 
difficulties     
Failure  
(PW3)   
technical 
integration issues      
 
In PW1, early foresight in terms of planning for CCS development and deployment means 
that CCS designs and practices are modified to facilitate system integration. This could 
include technical things like over-sizing of pipelines, development of storage hubs, as well 
as non-technical things like arrangements to share storage sites between multiple 
operators. In PW2A, collaboration arrangements crumble, as the political support and 
financial viability is eroded. In PW2B, collaboration is difficult, but not unmanageable. A 
failure scenario, PW3, could include also serious technical problems emerging regarding 
the operation of CCS systems. 
 
 
Table 9 Uncertainty 5: Economics and finance 
  2015 2020 2025 2030 
On track  
(PW1)    
costs have 
peaked and start 
to fall; targeted 
support & 
flexibility valued   
Momentum lost 
(PW2A)   
large cost hikes, 
flagging support  
Slow and sporadic  
(PW2B)   
moderate cost 
hikes niches with EOR   
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Failure  
(PW3)        
 
In PW1, good early technology choices pay off in terms of costs peaking relatively early, and 
thereafter improving. In PW2A, choices were less fortunate and costs still rise well into the 
2020s, due to technical problems. Similar issues, but less severe problems occur in PW2B. 
EOR is here a potential life-saver niche for CCS. 
 
 
Table 10 Uncertainty 6: Politics, policy and regulation 
  2015 2020 2025 2030 
On track  
(PW1) 
early choices, 
smooth 
permitting, gov. 
builds expertise 
support for 2nd 
tranche     
Momentum lost 
(PW2A) early choices 
support for 2nd 
tranche support falters  
Slow and sporadic  
(PW2B) 
not early 
choices, patchy 
permitting, weak 
planning 
support for 2nd 
tranche, policy 
learning kicks in     
Failure  
(PW3) no support       
 
PW1, again, represents an ‘ideal ‘ case of extensive policy learning and strong early support, 
In PW2A, early action is less well considered (and lucky), eventually leading to practical 
problems, as well as eroding support. In PW2B, policy learning is slower than in PW1, but 
gets there eventually. 
 
 
Table 11 Uncertainty 7: Public acceptance 
  2015 2020 2025 2030 
On track  
early, real 
engagement 
public largely 
silent     
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(PW1) 
Momentum lost 
(PW2A) 
little 
engagement 
some reactions 
against routes 
and costs 
snowballing 
protests  
Slow and sporadic  
(PW2B) 
patchy 
engagement 
some reactions 
against routes 
and costs motley reactions   
Failure  
(PW3)   
opposition to CO2 
transport and bad 
consultations     
 
In PW2A, weak early engagement – especially with regard to onshore pipelines - contributes 
to a backlash against the technology. Rising costs contribute to reduced acceptability. This 
is avoided in PW1, by early engagement, giving local communities real influence (as well as 
better outcomes in terms of technology costs). PW3 illustrates the fact that public 
opposition could be a severe problem, especially if consultation and engagement efforts are 
done badly. 
 
Reading tables 6-11 by time period, it is clear that the ‘key developments’ (marked red and 
underlined above) are related. Overall, four distinct branching points can be identified. See 
table 12, figure 3 and the following description. 
 
Table 12 Branching points 
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Figure 5 Pathways and branching points 
 
 
 
 
2015 
#1 CCS gets off to a really good start, or not. A good start (‘On Track’) would be due to 
early, comprehensive policy support, including a comprehensive programme of storage site 
characterisation, a sensible and reassuring liability regime, and thorough public 
engagement giving real influence to local communities and network design modifications to 
prepare for a future CO2 grid and European interconnections. 
 
Development momentum is here built up (or not) in a virtuous circle of improvements on 
one uncertainty making progress on another easier. For example, progress with designing 
strict (but workable) regulation of storage helps reassuring publics about the safety of 
storage, which in turn paves the way for faster permitting and deployment. Similarly, good 
progress with a number of technology variants demonstrated means experience 
accumulates on performance and costs, which in turn could make the making of supportive 
policy more palatable. 
 
#2 CCS could get going, or not stand a chance at all (‘Failure’). The latter would happen 
through no (or very limited) policy support: no incentives provided, no site characterisation 
done, no public engagement, etc. This means no momentum at all gets built.  
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Note that there is a middle path here with some policy support (‘Slow and Sporadic’). 
 
2020 
#3 A longer period of experimentation and hesitation. If the policy support is of middling 
strength and there is little selection among technology variants early on, the ‘Slow and 
Sporadic’ pathway may run into some problems around 2020. A range of problems mean 
that costs are still rising (or at least not coming down), and public support is also patchy. 
CCS however, is feasible in favourable market niches. (CCS may thereafter develop better in 
the 2030s, but that is outside the scope of this analysis). 
 
But, if we add to this hesitant start a history of badly done consultations on CCS and the 
technology may come to face widespread opposition. If that happens, it may be rather hard 
to get back ‘on track’. CCS could then still fail (this would be a slightly different version of 
the ‘Failure’ pathway). 
 
2025 
#4 Early good progress could hit a dead end if it is revealed that bad choices were made 
early on (‘Momentum Lost’). Early choice of (lock-in to) technology variants may turn out to 
be mistakes, with ever-rising costs and declining public support. It could be that early, 
strong policy push helps to mobilise and coordinate actors, which could facilitate system 
integration, and support the establishment of a strong design consensus. Any negative 
effects of this may not be evident until some time has passed, say until the mid 20s.  
 
Strong policy push could also result in giving in to the temptation of neglecting public 
engagement and ‘letting sleeping dogs lie’, which could make for good progress with early 
projects. There is a risk for public opposition snowballing, and leading to a general 
backlash. Again, this could take some time and lead to a loss of momentum and even a stop 
in deployment. Moreover, if in a strong push to get CCS going, corners are cut with site 
selection and characterisation, and the storage sites turn out to not be as safe and reliable 
as expected, this can contribute to the public backlash, as well as cause (expectations about 
)cost increases through growing remediation expenditure and liability payouts. 
 
Considering all the branching points, it is worth noting that there are more of them early on 
in the period studied than late. This may reflect the relative difficulty in telling credible, 
detailed stories the further we go into the future. 
 
Revising the indicators 
The next step in the analysis is to compare the branching point descriptions above with the 
assessment ‘indicators’ from WP1; see table 13. The questions here are 1) whether have not 
covered some of the indicators (and if that matters) and 2) if we could and should suggest 
new ones? 
 
A comparison suggests that there is scope for adding a few more useful indicators: 
- Network design modifications (for the uncertainty public acceptance) and 
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- Dominance of market niches (scaling up and speed of development) 
They have been added to table 13 and underlined in red. 
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Table 13 Indicators (from WP1) 
Key uncertainties Indicators 
1. ‘Variety of pathways’ - Number of technology variants 
- Relative importance of variants for technology developers 
- Market share of technology variants 
- Extent of lock-in / dominance of particular technology 
variant 
2 ‘Safe storage’ - Availability of storage site data, including agreed robust 
estimates of their capacity 
- Nature of legal / regulatory framework to share risks / 
liabilities 
- Levels of public awareness / acceptance of risks 
3. ‘Scaling up and speed 
of development and 
deployment’ 
- Unit size, capacity and efficiency 
- Speed of unit scaling 
- Cumulative investment / installed capacity 
- Relative importance of market niches 
4. ‘Integration of CCS 
systems’ 
- Whether full chain integration has been achieved? 
- The allocation of responsibility for integration 
- Presence, role and importance of ‘system integrator’ 
firms/actors 
- Nature of development, including roles of key actors and 
the relative importance of ‘bottom up’ / emergent and ‘top 
down’ / directed development 
5. ‘Economic and 
financial viability’ 
- Costs, including assessment of quality of cost data 
- Key financial risks and ‘financeability’ 
- Role of subsidies, other forms of economic / financial 
support, and other sources of finance (shared with 
uncertainty 6) 
6. ‘Policy, political and 
regulatory uncertainty’ 
- Nature of legal / regulatory framework to share risks / 
liabilities 
- Role of subsidies, other forms of economic / financial 
support, and other sources of finance (shared with 
uncertainty 5) 
- Role of other forms of policy support 
- Extent of political commitment / legitimacy 
7. ‘Public acceptance’ - Levels of public awareness / acceptance of risks  
- Specific manifestation of public opposition (or support) 
- Quality of public engagement 
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Furthermore, a few indicators have not been covered so far in the branching point analysis: 
- Relative importance (of technology variant) for technology developers (variety of 
pathways) 
- Role of system integrator firms (system integration) 
This does not prove that they are not relevant to CCS, but may just reflect choice of 
analogues and the choice of focus in our analysis of them. Therefore, they will be kept as 
part of the framework. It should be noted though that the evidence supporting them comes 
from the literature review (in WP1) and not the case studies. 
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5. Conclusions 
Methodological conclusions 
 
The pathways analysis can usefully serve as way of analysing the conditions for ‘successful’ 
and ‘unsuccessful’ CCS deployment by 2030 and what actions will influence the outcome.  
 
The analysis has also been helpful for the application of case study findings (from WP2) to 
CCS, and thus to illustrate how these are relevant to CCS. 
 
The framework from WP1 was reasonably robust. The set of criteria should be revised 
slightly, and we have suggested adding a few new criteria, which emerged from the cases 
and the pathways analysis. 
 
Policy conclusions 
 
We have identified a set of key branching points that show things that policy makers should 
be monitoring for with regard to possible CCS futures. 
 
Good progress towards 2030 targets presupposes comprehensive policy support now. This 
needs to include: 
 
 Financial support that recognises the unique characteristics of CCS plant 
 A large programme of site characterisation 
 A sensible and reassuring storage liability regime 
 Thorough public engagement, giving real influence to local communities and other 
stakeholders 
 CCS project, system and network designs that are modified in preparation for a 
future CO2 grid and European interconnections 
 
Whilst strong policy signals and support would be required to give CCS a good start, there 
are also risks associated with accelerated innovation and the cutting of corners: 
 
 It is tempting to focus efforts and resources on one or a few technological varieties 
early on. This may help to speed up development, but comes with increased risks of 
picking weak technology 
 It may also be tempting to try to bypass local opinion and wide stakeholder 
engagement. Whilst it may well be possible to force through early projects, this 
strategy means that there is a risk of protests growing over time 
 Similarly, there may be a temptation to choose convenient and cheap storage options 
for the first projects. If due consideration is not given to ensuring the safety and 
reliability of storage, there are risks of cost increases from remediation expenditure 
and liability payouts, as well as a backlash in public opinion. 
43 
UK Energy Research Centre    
 
 
44 
UK Energy Research Centre    
Appendix 1, Fuel and technology mix 
 
The ‘On Track’ pathway assumes that the UK plays a significant role in commercial-scale 
demonstration of CCS and that the first commercial-scale integrated power plant CCS 
project in the UK demonstration programme (and also early projects in other countries) is 
successfully storing CO2 by 2016. As yet it is too early to say whether a particular CCS 
technology will emerge as a clear winner.  In fact, it can be argued that a range of 
technologies could prove to be both technically and financially viable depending on a 
number of factors including sensitivity to site-specific factors (e.g. access to markets for 
potential co-products from pre-combustion capture that would not be produced by other 
CO2 capture technologies) and potential diversity in the role that plants using CCS might 
play within the broader electricity/energy system (e.g. demand for flexible operation or 
provision of baseload power) (Chalmers et al. 2009). 
 
Another important factor in determining if and how CCS is used at all and, to some extent 
which particular technology choices are made, is the fuel mix in the power generation sector 
(and any other industrial sectors where CCS could or is being deployed).  In particular, 
although much of the discourse has focussed on CCS being used to ‘clean up’ coal there has 
been increasing interest in if, how, and when CCS might be applied to natural gas-fired 
power plants.  This reflects both a response to significant reductions in natural gas prices 
and also climate change policy developments suggesting that more significant reductions in 
CO2 emissions may be required in the UK power generation sector than was typically 
expected by most stakeholders even only 2-3 years ago (CCC 2009;CCC 2010a;DECC 2009). 
It is, therefore, useful to make a number of observations that bear upon the fuel mix 
question, and we have grouped these under two scenarios – gas dominated and coal 
dominated: 
 
Gas-dominated scenario 
 The latest cost estimates (on a levelised £/MWh basis, and allowing for carbon costs) 
suggest that gas-fired CCS will be cheaper than coal-fired CCS, across the spectrum of 
technologies ( 2010;Mott MacDonald 2011). The higher CO2 intensity of unabated coal 
does of course mean that policy support through carbon pricing rewards coal-fired CCS 
relatively more than gas-fired CCS but the most recent estimates suggest that this is not 
enough to offset the higher costs of coal-fired generation, at least for new-build plant. 
 On a whole-plant basis (base power plant plus CCS plant) gas-fired CCS technologies 
(certainly post-combustion) also offer significantly lower capital cost than for coal-fired 
CCS (ibid), which prospective investors prefer even if the lifetime costs per MWh are 
similar.  
 Given the current market structure, policy and regulatory environment, unabated CCGT 
is the clear preferred choice for new build power generation in the UK (Gross et al 2010), 
notwithstanding the significant renewables deployment which has been driven by strong 
policy support. Furthermore, the EMR White Paper (DECC 2011b) makes clear provision 
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for new unabated gas plants – and there is a strong political ‘push’ to make sure that 
investors in unabated gas are not put off by low carbon policies that are too stringent, 
see for e.g. oral evidence by Hendry to the ECC Committee on energy security (Hendry 
2011). From an industry perspective, gas-fired generation is already ‘on the table’ 
whereas new coal is clearly not (and there have been no new coal-fired plants in the UK 
for almost 40 years). Arguably therefore, it may seem a smaller step for the electricity 
generation industry to move to gas-fired CCS rather than coal-fired CCS. 
 
Coal-dominated scenario 
 There may be system and societal benefits in having a proportion of coal-fired CCS (e.g. 
increased diversity of fuel sources and reduced exposure to gas price volatility), 
although the market would need to be structured and regulated so that operators of 
coal-fired CCS plants could be rewarded for providing these benefits. There may also be 
foreign policy rationales for a focus on coal (which have clearly driven this emphasis to 
date (DECC 2009), such as the need to demonstrate CCS in a way that is relevant to 
countries like China, India and the US which have coal-dominated electricity systems. 
 It may be that there are other commercial considerations which would encourage 
companies to build coal-fired CCS over gas-fired CCS, such as to provide a hedge 
against future gas prices, although the experience of the UK electricity market is that 
wholesale gas price rises can be passed through to consumers anyway (Gross et al 
2010). 
 Coal-fired CCS may be cheaper than gas-fired CCS in terms of cost per tonne of CO2 
abated, which may be significant if that is the metric on which policy support is based. 
This is also linked to the issue of retrofitting CCS to existing power stations because in 
these circumstances the lower abatement cost (and the possibility of extending the life 
of an existing asset) may favour coal plant (Gibbins et al. 2011). 
 
Gas-dominated versus coal-dominated scenarios 
Whilst there may not be enough information to come to a firm conclusion as to which fuel 
will dominate, it does seem reasonable to ask what would drive coal-fired CCS projects in 
the UK if the investment proposition for gas-fired CCS is apparently more convincing. In the 
absence of policy support or regulation which specifically targets coal-fired CCS, it is 
difficult to see the compelling investment proposition for a generating company who would 
be expected to favour the lower capital cost and lower costs per MWh of gas-fired CCS 
options in a market such as the UK where they can pass through fuel costs to consumers. 
The possible exception is the special case of retrofitting to existing coal-fired plant. There 
may also be a case for firms to undertake ‘hedging’ strategies given uncertainty about 
future gas prices – but this may not be a strong case since electricity prices are strongly 
linked to gas prices now. The pathways therefore assume that gas-fired plant will 
predominate in CCS deployment. 
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